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1. The commitment to adopt the euro
The 10 new member states are now facing the chal-
lenge of framing and implementing policies for adopt-
ing the euro. They are all bound by the EU Treaty to 
replace their national currencies with the euro at some 
future time as they were admitted to the Union with a 
derogation to this effect. In order to prepare adequately 
for entry to the euro area, the candidates need to un-
dergo fi scal and monetary convergence. In principle, 
they should refrain from lax fi scal policies that could 
skew the eurozone policy mix by forcing the  European 
Central Bank (ECB) to tighten monetary policy. They 
should consistently reduce any public debt accumu-
lation that could result in a banking crisis and sub-
sequently put pressure on the ECB to monetize it. On 
purely technical grounds, to enter the European com-
mon currency system the euro candidates must satisfy 
the Maastricht fi scal and monetary convergence cri-
teria. The original criteria are spelled out in the Treaty 
protocols dating back to 1991. Their viability and appli-
cability to the new member states are currently subject 
to intense scrutiny, as they refl ect the European Com-
mission’s apparent precept that the euro candidates 
should be treated as an isomorphic block, disregarding 
their structural and institutional differences (Kenen and 
Meade 2003). 
2. Compliance with Maastricht
Despite the controversies surrounding the convergence 
criteria, they remain in place as strict requirements for 
euro adoption. At the present time, new member state 
compliance with the convergence criteria is diverse and, 
generally speaking, far from satisfactory, at least ac-
cording to the European Central Bank in its recent Con-
vergence Report (ECB 2004). The ECB concluded that 
satisfactory pursuit of the convergence process required 
that the candidates resolve their profound structural 
fi scal challenges and devise effective monetary policies 
aimed at securing price stability. The key convergence 
indicators are presented in Table 1.
A glimpse at the relevant country data reveals that 
new member states face a range of problems.1 A com-
parison of data with the Maastricht benchmarks (ref-
erence values) suggests that the smaller new member 
states, particularly Estonia and Lithuania, appear to be 
ready for euro adoption, while the larger new member 
states have yet to achieve satisfactory fi scal and mon-
etary stability. With the exception of Slovakia and the 
Baltic States, the new EU entrants do not fare well on 
fi scal criteria. General government defi cits exceed the 
three-per cent limit stipulated by the EU Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), refl ecting mainly large primary ex-
penditures on social transfers, in particular substantial 
contingent fi scal liabilities in the form of guarantees 
and strong commitments to future pension obliga-
tions. Excessive fi scal defi cits have clearly exacerbated 
the public debt to GDP ratios, which range from low 
levels in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, through bor-
derline high in Slovenia, Poland and Hungary, to exces-
sive in Cyprus and Malta. These countries are engaged 
in equally intense struggles in respect of achieving price 
stability. Infl ation rates have been excessive in Slovenia, 
Hungary and, to some extent, Latvia and Slovakia. They 
have been on the edge of the reference rate in Poland 
and Malta, and successfully contained in the remaining 
four new member states. Nevertheless, headline infl a-
tion has increased, particularly in the aftermath of the 
May 2004 accession, although the recent price shock 
can be perceived as temporary, not threatening price 
stability in the long run. It stems mainly from EU acces-
sion-related increases in indirect taxes and administered 
prices, along with higher energy prices (ECB 2004). 
Some threats to price stability stem from renewed wage 
pressures that have contributed to rising unit labor 
costs. In light of these developments, policymakers in 
the euro candidate countries face the task of devising 
optimal convergence policies. 
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Feasibility and timing of euro adoption 
by the new EU member states
1 A detailed analysis of the individual countries’ compliance 
with the offi cial criteria is beyond the scope of this brief 
study, which is aimed solely at synthesising the main conjec-
tures concerning optimal policies leading to euro adoption 
and not at examining the depth of the structural and system-
ic problems faced by the candidates. 
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However, it should be noted that fi nding a single 
comprehensive convergence policy and a uniform ad-
justment process for the 10 new member states may 
be an impossible task, considering their vast systemic 
differences. The Maastricht criteria are certainly insuf-
fi cient to offer useful guidance to policymakers in this 
respect. Therefore, specifi c convergence policies need 
to be designed on a case-by-case basis and carefully 
 tailored to national characteristics. 
3. Monetary policies for convergence – 
no common prescription
Scepticism about “one-size-fi ts-all” policy prescrip-
tions has emerged on the basis of a heated debate 
about optimal monetary policies for euro adoption. In 
essence, adoption of the euro will mean that the indi-
vidual countries relinquish their monetary autonomy, 
which will entail certain short-run costs. These costs are 
likely to be minimized if adjustments to monetary policy 
regimes are properly designed and tailored to the indi-
vidual country’s circumstances in the course of active 
 preparations for euro adoption. There is now a consen-
sus in the literature that the smaller candidate coun-
tries, such as the Baltic States, that rely on a currency 
board arrangement to guide their monetary policies will 
be best served by maintaining their existing monetary 
regimes during their fi nal passage toward the euro. 
This is because their fi nancial markets are relatively less 
developed and thus susceptible to large, potentially 
destabilizing shocks. If greater monetary fl exibility was 
adopted, it would precipitate fi nancial volatility and so 
present investors with a higher country risk. A depar-
ture from the current hard peg would probably jeopard-
ize direct investment and hamper economic growth in 
these countries. As a result, it would unnecessarily defer 
euro adoption by the smaller new member states.
In contrast to the smaller new member states, there 
is little consensus about effective monetary policies for 
euro adoption in relation to the larger new member 
states. The ongoing debate includes a variety of policy 
proposals, ranging from a leap to unilateral euroization 
to prolonged reliance on autonomous monetary re-
gimes based on direct infl ation targeting (DIT). Despite 
the controversies, there is a common belief that au-
tonomous policies based on exclusive targeting of mon-
etary growth or infl ation would generate sub-optimal 
results. This qualm undoubtedly derives from the strict 
DIT policies currently being followed by the National 
Bank of Poland and the Czech National Bank. 
The proponents of unilateral euro adoption, includ-
ing Bratkowski and Rostowski (2001), Buiter and Grafe 
(2002) and Begg et al. (2003), have identifi ed a number 
Table 1: Fiscal and monetary convergence indicators for new member states
(excluding the exchange rate stability criterion) 
HICP infl ationa) Long-term 
interest ratesa) 
General govern-
ment budget 
(share of GDP)b)
General govern-
ment gross debt 
(share of GDP)b)
Percentage 
change in gross 
debt ratio from 
2002 to 2004
Czech Rep.  1.8  4.7 –5.0  37.9  +9.1
Estonia  2.0 n.a. +0.3  4.8  –0.5
Cyprus  2.1  5.2 –5.2  72.6  +5.2
Latvia  4.9  5.0 –2.0  14.7  +0.6
Lithuania  –0.2  4.7 –2.6  21.4  –1.0
Hungary  6.5  8.1 –5.5  59.9  +2.7
Malta  2.6  4.7 –5.2  73.8  +11.1
Poland  2.5  6.9 –5.6  47.2  +6.1
Slovakia  4.1  5.2 –2.3  30.8  +1.3
Slovenia  8.4  5.1 –3.9  44.5  +1.2
Reference values  2.4 %  6.4 % –3.0 %  60.0 % –
Notes: a) Average annual rates for September 2003–August 2004. b) European Commission projections for 2004.
Reference values for monetary convergence indicators are based on average annual infl ation rates in Finland, Denmark and Swe-
den (three lowest infl ation EU members) in September 2003–August 2004 plus 1.5 per cent; and their average long-term interest 
rates during the same period plus 2 per cent.
Indicators satisfying the Maastricht criteria are in bold.
Source: European Central Bank, 2004 Convergence Report. 
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of benefi ts that could result from such a bold move. 
Certainly, prompt entry into the euro area would entail 
considerably lower costs for both current and capital 
transactions. It would also bring about lower interest 
rates, although they would not be fully aligned with 
those in the eurozone as banking systems in the new 
member states are considerably less competitive (Nuti 
2002). Nevertheless, lending rates in a prompt euro en-
trant would still carry a risk premium as long as institu-
tional convergence of the fi nancial systems remained 
incomplete. Perhaps the least questionable benefi t of 
prompt euroization would be the elimination of ex-
change rate risk. As a consequence, exposure to specu-
lative attacks on the currency would be lower. However, 
similar effects can be achieved by implementing fully 
autonomous, yet disciplined fi scal and monetary poli-
cies. Possible direct costs associated with a rush to eur-
oization may entail the initial drainage of international 
reserves, a loss of seigniorage revenues to the govern-
ment and surrender of the central bank’s lender-of-last-
resort function. However, these direct costs may prove 
to be rather insignifi cant as seigniorage revenues or 
central bank emergency lending activities are negligible 
in new member states at present. More qualifi ed res-
ervations about the leap to euroization attach to rising 
unit labor costs and the danger of losing the ability to 
respond adequately to asymmetric shocks. Such disad-
vantages may be particularly pronounced in a country 
whose monetary, real and institutional convergence ef-
forts are far from completion. If the candidate country 
moves swiftly to euroization while its convergence is 
only partially complete, it may initially experience con-
siderable fi nancial disintermediation, as both deposi-
tory and lending activities shift abroad to more effi cient 
fi nancial centres. In addition, unit labor costs may in-
crease as wage demands outpace productivity growth. 
As a result, rising production costs may curtail invest-
ment and economic growth, thus increasing unem-
ployment. In any case, it will take some time for these 
short- and medium-term costs to dissipate. In essence, 
the timing of formal euro adoption should matter less 
than establishing a timeframe for successful comple-
tion of monetary, real and institutional convergence 
(Orlowski 2001; Nuti 2002). A few more years of mon-
etary independence combined with disciplined fi scal 
policies to prepare adequately for euro entry may prove 
benefi cial. This extra time would also allow for comple-
tion of the necessary institutional reforms. 
Alternative proposals for more gradualist adjust-
ments in monetary policy are based on extensions to 
the current rather strict DIT regimes, incorporating 
greater fl exibility. In other words, they assign different 
weights to infl ation and exchange rate stability targets. 
Infusion of the exchange rate stability objective is be-
lieved to be critical for achieving successful monetary 
convergence with the euro. Despite the different policy 
prescriptions among the proposals, the gradualist ap-
proach recognizes the importance of having suffi cient 
time for the successful pursuit if not the full completion 
of monetary, real and institutional convergence. 
A rather extreme solution – a far-reaching depar-
ture from the current strict DIT policies – is proposed 
by Bofi nger and Wollmershäuser (2001, 2002) who 
advocate adopting a monetary regime based on fl ex-
ible exchange rate targeting during the fi nal passage 
toward the euro. In their policy scenario, exchange rate 
stability becomes the key policy objective, while price 
stability plays a secondary role only, as it is presumed 
to be derived from less volatile exchange rates. How-
ever, if fi nancial markets in new member states are in-
stitutionally unprepared and, therefore, not resilient to 
nominal shocks, efforts toward achieving exchange rate 
stability may entail frequent and costly interventions. 
In addition, it is highly uncertain whether a monetary 
regime focusing on exchange rate stability (even in a 
stricter form than the one allowed by ERM II) would in 
fact contribute to price stability. This is because the ex-
change rate channel of monetary policy transmission 
in the larger new member states is ambiguous and un-
stable (Orlowski 2003 and 2005; Golinelli and Rovelli 
2004). Therefore, a smooth transmission of more stable 
exchange rates into low infl ation cannot be guaran-
teed.
A more balanced weighting of infl ation and ex-
change rate stability targets is advocated by Jonas 
(2004). His “dual-target and one-instrument” policy 
scenario is an extension of the present DIT regimes as it 
calls for assigning equal importance to infl ation and ex-
change rate stability targets. However, the implementa-
tion of such a policy may pose serious diffi culties as sev-
eral plausible confl ict areas between both targets can 
be identifi ed. Among them is a possible combination 
of currency appreciation and high infl ation in the pres-
ence of large capital infl ows to new member states. A 
proper response to a stronger national currency would 
require lowering interest rates that could subsequently 
jeopardize the infl ation target. On the contrary, raising 
interest rates by a central bank in response to higher 
infl ation may lead to currency appreciation and exacer-
bate exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless, the confl icts 
between both targets become pronounced only in the 
presence of the so-called Balassa–Samuelson effects, 
which are believed to be prevalent in transition econo-
mies (Buiter and Grafe 2002; Begg et al. 2003; Mihaljek 
and Klau 2004; DeGrauwe and Schnabl 2004). Accord-
ing to the Balassa–Samuelson phenomenon, an increas-
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ingly open, growing economy is likely to experience 
a productivity shock in the tradable goods sector that 
drives up wages in non-tradables, thus contributing to 
chronic infl ation. If this is the case, early unilateral eu-
roization would probably contain infl ationary pressures 
from this source (Bratkowski and Rostowski 2001). 
However, there is compelling empirical evidence that 
the Balassa–Samuelson effect in new member states is 
rather insignifi cant (Égert et al. 2003), which may lead 
to the conclusion that the suggestion of potential con-
fl icts between infl ation and exchange rate stability tar-
gets has little merit, along with the arguments for early 
euroization derived from it. 
Among the proponents of gradual policy adjust-
ments, Orlowski (2004) assigns the highest priority to 
the infl ation target. He proposes a policy framework 
based on targeting the differentials between the candi-
date country and the eurozone infl ation forecasts. Such 
a forward-looking policy regime is viewed as conducive 
to euro adoption. In this monetary policy framework, 
the infl ation forecast differential becomes the key oper-
ating target while exchange rate stability is treated only 
as a major indicator variable, and not as an auxiliary op-
erating target. The proposed regime allows policymak-
ers to focus exclusively on price stability as the main cri-
terion of monetary convergence, so underpinning their 
strong commitment to price convergence prior to euro 
adoption. Moreover, the proposed policy regime would 
also underpin commitment to price stability when pos-
sible confl icts between disinfl ation and exchange rate 
stability arise. In essence, this forward-looking monetary 
policy regime advances the present DIT policies pursued 
by the Czech Republic, Poland and, to some extent, 
Hungary. 
4. Fiscal consolidation – 
principal controversies
Equally intense controversies surround fi scal policies as 
fi scal discipline is believed to be particularly conducive 
to a successful fi nal passage toward the euro, and nec-
essary for aiding monetary adjustment efforts. There 
is a consensus in the literature that the three-per cent 
threshold prescribed by SGP as the maximum permit-
ted government budget defi cit in relation to GDP is 
rather demanding for new member states and that the 
European Commission should recast this benchmark 
(Szapáry 2000; Nuti 2002). The permitted defi cit seems 
too narrow to enable governments to complete ongo-
ing deep structural and institutional reforms. Moreover, 
the three-per cent limit applies to all countries equally, 
regardless of their public debt levels. This makes little 
economic sense and the focus should be shifted instead 
to government efforts to achieve debt sustainability 
(Rostowski 2004). Briefl y stated, highly indebted coun-
tries should be required to balance their budgets or to 
run surpluses in order to gradually relax the debt bur-
den. By contrast, those new member states that have 
low debt-to-GDP ratios should be allowed to overrun 
the mechanical three-per cent limit in order to speed 
up the structural adjustments necessary to deepen their 
economic integration with “old” EU members. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus in the 
literature that SGP rigidity and its one-dimensional char-
acter are counterproductive as regards the quality of 
fi scal consolidation in new member states. This criti-
cism holds true particularly when the government debt 
in relation to GDP becomes very high, prompting the 
authorities to cut expenditures while avoiding revenue-
based consolidation (von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and 
Strauch 2001). The expenditure cuts are likely to ham-
per economic growth more severely than the alterna-
tive tax increases. Moreover, SGP lacks a clear analytical 
foundation due to its simplicity. For instance, its calls for 
equal efforts to contain the budget defi cit regardless 
of business cycle conditions are evidently oversimpli-
fi ed. In consequence, defi cit reduction during economic 
slowdowns may exacerbate business cycle fl uctuations; 
in other words, SGP-driven fi scal tightening becomes 
pro-cyclical during economic downturns. The fi nal, fre-
quently criticized shortcoming of SGP is that its infl ex-
ibility reduces the ability to respond to asymmetric, 
country-specifi c shocks. Therefore, SGP does not allow 
for the consideration of proper structural and institu-
tional adjustment, something which may vary substan-
tially among individual new member states. 
Challenges to fi scal policies in the fi nal passage to 
the euro also derive from a number of internal factors. 
Among them, the most burdensome to policymakers 
are the rigidities associated with social subsidies and 
formula-driven social transfers (Schadler 2004). These 
commitments are prevalent in all new member states 
due to population ageing which is expected to put 
substantial pressure on pension systems that in several 
countries are still based on the pay-as-you-go principle. 
Moreover, projected population ageing is likely to put 
additional pressures on public fi nances if further nec-
essary reforms of pension systems are delayed. Social 
rigidities will be hard to overcome if labor market and 
pension system reforms are carried out. 
More manageable challenges to fi scal stability are 
associated with temporary, one-off adjustments in tax 
rates. In particular, EU accession has necessitated in-
creases in indirect taxation in all 10 new member states. 
These increases contributed to renewed infl ationary 
Internationale Politikanalyse
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pressures in the second half of 2004. However, these 
effects are likely to dissipate in the near future and are 
not expected to jeopardize fi scal consolidation efforts 
and medium-term defi cit-debt adjustments.
It can be further anticipated that fi scal policy will 
have to play an active role in restoring a proper bal-
ance between short-run accession costs and its more 
dynamic, long-run benefi ts. The immediate accession-
related costs are likely to outweigh the benefi ts that will 
materialize only after some time. Consequently, the ini-
tial gap between large contributions to EU budgets and 
smaller EU transfers to new member states is likely to 
adversely affect public support for integration, including 
future euro adoption. An increase in domestic expendi-
tures may be required to offset such temporary acces-
sion-related net costs.
Nevertheless, the ability to maintain fi scal discipline 
will be critical for successful convergence. More specifi -
cally, a disciplined fi scal policy is critical for lowering in-
terest rates and achieving more stable exchange rates. 
In turn, lower interest rates and lower exchange rate 
risk premia will probably promote investment and in-
come growth, and also allow more expansionary mone-
tary policies. In contrast, a failure to maintain fi scal dis-
cipline will force central banks to apply a very restrictive 
monetary policy, which will hinder structural reforms 
and economic growth in new member states.
5. The road ahead – coping with ERM II
As argued above, the smaller new member states 
would be well served by maintaining their present cur-
rency board arrangements, while the larger ones that 
target infl ation will have to modify their monetary poli-
cies in order to accommodate the objective of exchange 
rate stability. Regardless of the applied adjustment, the 
new member states can and should avail themselves of 
the exchange rate fl exibility afforded by ERM II, provid-
ing that the “standard” plus-minus 15 per cent band 
of currency fl uctuations holds rather than the “normal” 
band of 2.25 per cent prescribed by ERM I. Certainly, 
their participation in ERM II will necessitate a reorienta-
tion of their monetary regime in order to take account 
of possible exchange rate shocks. In essence, the stand-
ard band offers enough fl exibility to accommodate 
these shocks, particularly in the absence of active inter-
ventions by central banks pursuing DIT policies. 
This analysis clearly favors infl ation-targeting policies 
as more conducive to effective monetary convergence 
with the euro than those based on exchange-rate tar-
geting. Flexible infl ation-targeting regimes offer attrac-
tive advantages over those based on currency stability 
objectives, particularly the ones based on soft pegs. An 
exclusive focus on the exchange rate target does not 
necessarily forestall large currency shocks, especially if 
the country’s fi nancial system is inadequately prepared 
for their absorption. In addition, a currency peg, par-
ticularly one associated with the narrow 2.25 volatility 
margin, increases the risk attributable to misspecifi ca-
tion of the reference rate. If the offi cial reference rate 
is too weak – that is, set well below the dynamic equi-
librium rate – it could infl ate the domestic value of for-
eign currency debt and raise the default risk. If it is too 
strong, it could precipitate signifi cant short-term capital 
infl ows, exacerbating infl ation. In any case, a wider tol-
erance band would create a cushion preventing such 
undesirable effects. Thus, the candidate countries face 
the challenge of a careful specifi cation of the ERM II 
 offi cial reference rate that roughly corresponds to the 
dynamic equilibrium exchange rate. 
Equally challenging are fi scal policy efforts aimed at 
maintaining a proper balance between the stringent 
objectives of fi scal convergence and those necessitated 
by structural reforms and social obligations. 
In hindsight, the tasks of monetary and fi scal conver-
gence to the euro are very complex; their framing and 
implementation pose major challenges to policymak-
ers in new member states. Their search for appropriate 
policies and practices that are appropriate for the fi nal 
passage toward the euro fi nd some support in the lit-
erature, which, has not arrived at uniform optimal solu-
tions. On practical grounds, however, the new member 
states’ convergence with the euro is unprecedented, as 
there is almost no evidence on comparable reforms and 
experiences with monetary integration in the econo-
mies of the world. 
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